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The purpose of this dissertation is to access the impact stricter employment protection 
legislation on the use of fixed-term contracts as a screening device. To achieve this, I first 
confirm the results found by Centeno and Novo (2012) on the impact of the 2004 labor code 
reform over excess worker turnover and the share of fixed-term contracts on Portuguese 
firms, and then explore the link between those indicators and the transition of fixed-term to 
open-ended contracts. While the link between more stringent employment protection 
legislation and a higher reliance on fixed term contracts seems clear, the strategy of using 
fixed-term contracts as a screening device appears to be persistent, and more affected by 
idiosyncratic factors than external policy changes. 
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The role of fixed term contracts in a two-tier labor market is twofold: to provide a 
more flexible instrument for firms to adjust employment level, and to be used as a 
screening device to find better worker-firm matches. When the employment 
protection gap between contract types is wide, fixed-term contracts end up carrying 
the burden of the higher protection conferred to open-ended contracts. As worker 
churning among fixed-term contracts increases and firms refrain from converting fixed 
term to open ended contracts, the search and matching process becomes more 
inefficient, with negative effects for productivity. 
Using empirical evidence from Portugal, Centeno and Novo (2012) study the 
impact of the 2004 labor code reform which introduced more stringent legislation 
regarding dismissals of open-ended contracts for firms with 11 to 20 workers, by 
measuring the effects on excess worker turnover rates for both types of contracts, and 
the share of fixed-term workers on Portuguese firms. This quasi-experiment permitted 
the authors to confirm with empirical evidence the idea that a wider gap in 
employment protection legislation leads to higher rates of excess worker turnover 
among fixed-term contracts. Another consequence of a wider protection gap is the 
lower chance of a fixed-term contract to be converted into an open-ended contract, as 
firms avoid the risk associated with commitment to a contract with high dismissal 
costs. 
Drawing from the same causal evidence, the purpose of this MSc Thesis is to 
access the impact stricter employment protection legislation on the use of fixed-term 
contracts as a screening device. To achieve this, I first confirm the results found by 
Centeno and Novo (2012) on the impact of the reform over excess worker turnover 
and the share of fixed-term contracts on Portuguese firms, and then explore the link 
between those indicators and the transition of fixed-term to open-ended contracts. 
While the link between more stringent employment protection legislation and a higher 
reliance on fixed term contracts seems clear, the strategy of using fixed-term contracts 
as a screening device appears to be more resilient, and seems to be more affected by 





This MSc Thesis is organized as follows: chapter 2 presents the literature 
review, from job and worker flows to institutional reforms in the context of two-tier 
systems and the role of fixed-term contracts; chapter 3 provides the background of the 
institutional reform and describes the dataset used; chapter 4 explains the concepts 
and methodology used; chapter 5 presents the stylized facts and summary statistics of 
the Portuguese labor market; chapter 6 addresses the main questions; and chapter 7 
concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Job and worker flows 
The labor market can be described as a continuous search and matching process, 
where workers and firms search for the best possible match under imperfect 
information. In the form of information asymmetry, as Gibbons and Katz (1991) discuss 
it, current employers are better informed about the skills of their workers than 
prospective employers. When a firm decides to lay-off workers, it signals the market 
that those workers in particular might not be the best matches. However, when a plant 
is closed, the market does not infer it is due to the worker’s characteristics, but as a 
reaction of the firm to the market circumstances. Prospective employers will offer 
higher wages to workers displaced by plant closings than those displaced by layoffs, 
and the duration of the unemployment spell will also be longer for the later rather 
than the former. Another form of information uncertainty comes from match 
heterogeneity, where the quality of a match can not be perfectly assessed ex-ante, and 
it only becomes revealed as job tenure increases. This idea is developed by Jovanovic 
(1979), where the author presents a matching model where each worker and firm has 
a nondegenerate distribution of productivities across different jobs, and the problem is 
to optimally assign worker to be better suited jobs. As job tenure increases, the 
productivity of a match becomes better known, which can be thought as an 
“experience good”. Information uncertainty from the worker’s perspective is 
developed by Topel and Ward (1991). Using longitudinal data from the United States, 
they find wage gains at job changes to account for at least a third of early-career wage 





own skills, and only through trial he can fully access the best possible match. This 
strand of the literature addresses the question of why the simultaneity of hiring and 
separations exists, and it provides the theoretical background to further explore the 
dynamic relation between job and worker flows. 
We have now two branches in the literature, one focusing on worker flows and 
another on job flows, which follow different but complementary approaches. On the 
side of worker flows, Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), building upon the analyses of 
Diamond (1982), use a matching model to obtain endogenous job creation and job 
destruction processes and study their properties. They find different behaviors for job 
creation and job destruction, with the later being more volatile, as negative shocks 
alter the search behavior of worker and firms and fewer favorable matches are found. 
Their search and matching model has become the basis for the literature in this field. 
Regarding job flows, the book “Job Creation and Destruction” by Davis, Haltiwanger 
and Schuh (1996) has become the standard reference in the literature. It provides the 
definitions for key concepts such as gross job creation, destruction and reallocation, 
net job creation and excess worker turnover, explores differences within and across 
industries, relates job and worker flows to unemployment and business cycles, and 
discusses economic policy implications. The book compiles the main findings of the 
literature at the date, including but not limited to: Davis and Haltiwanger (1990) 
previous work on job creation and destruction, finding enormous dispersion in 
establishments’ employment growth rates, confirming Leonard (1987), and Dune, 
Roberts and Samuelson (1989) on the conclusion that within industry variations are 
larger than across industry variations; the previously mentioned Gibbons and Katz 
(1991) and Jovanovic (1979) on the importance of information asymmetry; and 
Diamond (1981) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) for their tremendous 
contribution in the theory of matching models. 
2.2 Cross-country comparisons 
Acknowledging the different strains in the literature Abowd, Corbel, and Kramarz 
(1999) contribute with a characterization of job and worker flows, using data from a 
sample of French establishments which permits the distinction between the two types 





not by increasing separations; two-thirds of all hires are on short-term contracts, and 
approximately one third of these are converted to long-term contracts at their 
termination. These findings are particularly important in the analysis of two-tiered 
labor markets1, in which employment protection legislation for permanent contracts is 
more stringent than for temporary contracts. Moreover, the conversion rate of one 
third of fixed-term contracts into permanent contracts seems to indicate the former 
are used as a screening device to access the quality of the worker-firm match. This idea 
will be later developed, but first it is useful to compare the findings of different 
authors for a different setting. 
Searching for a synthesis between the two branches of literature, Burgess, Lane 
and Stevens (2000) explore the relation between worker and job flows using empirical 
data of Maryland quarterly wage reports, which contains data on individual 
employees. The authors find churning flows2, worker flows in excess of those strictly 
necessary to achieve a given level of employment, to be high, pervasive and highly 
persistent within employers. They also find a link between churning flows and 
employment which motivates their following paper Burgess, Lane and Stevens (2001). 
Using empirical evidence, they show that on average, expanding increase their hiring 
rate refrain separations and contracting firms adjust by increasing their separation rate 
while slightly reducing hiring. The reason why all firms engage in worker churning can 
be found in match heterogeneity, and the attempt to change either the composition of 
the workforce or the quality of the matches. In contrast with Abowd et al. (1999), who 
found that French firms primarily adjust entry rather than exit rates, Burgess et al. 
(2001), find that American firms adjust to employment falls by increasing separations 
and reducing hiring, and also expanding firms, register high churning rates from quits, 
and separations as the firm tries to improve its workforce. They suggest the difference 
might be linked to the employment protection legislation between the two countries. 
                                                      
1
 Two-tier systems are characterized by the existence of two groups of workers with distinct 
employment conditions, ranging from salary, benefits and job stability. This feature may arise from 
national legislation, which typically confers higher employment protection to permanent over 
temporary contracts, or from collective agreements which favor incumbents over entrants. 
2
 Churning flows or excess worker turnover refer to the same concept, i.e. the worker flows in excess of 
job flows. In the literature review I refer to the concepts according to the terms chosen by the authors, 





On the subject of cross-country comparison, a recent paper by Bassanini (2010) 
utilizes harmonized data from select group of OECD countries. Bassanini finds 
idiosyncratic firm characteristics such as industry, age, and size, to be a key factor in 
explaining job and worker flows in line with previous literature, and that both job and 
worker flows vary significantly across-countries, contrasting with some of the literature 
which defends that while worker flows do differ across-countries, job-flows do not. 
Excess job reallocation, the number of jobs created and destroyed within an industry in 
relation to net employment change, is at or above 25% in countries with flexible labor 
markets or a large informal sector, such as the USA, the UK, Brazil and Mexico, while in 
continental European countries that number is below 15%. However, worker churning 
seems to be invariant across countries, as job and worker flows tend to be of similar 
magnitude within countries. To quote a phrase from the article “Country effects, 
nonetheless, explain about one-third of the cross-country/cross-industry variation of 
worker flows, no matter what measure is considered, suggesting that policy and 
institutions play an important role in shaping the cross-country distribution of worker 
flows.” This leads us to further investigate the role of institutions. 
 
2.3 Institutional reforms and the role of fixed-term contracts 
To provide a theoretical background to a growing body of empirical studies regarding 
institutional reforms, Boeri (2010) proposes to critically review the recent empirical 
literature. The author begins by noting that most reforms over the past 20 years are 
only partial reforms that affect a specific segment of the labor market, creating two-
tier regimes and long lasting asymmetries. Boeri extends an equilibrium search model 
developed by Dale Mortensen and Christopher Pissarides3, in order to consider two-
tier regimes in the framework of employment protection, unemployment benefits, 
active labor market policies and employment conditional incentives. On the subject of 
employment protection legislation in two-tier markets, Boeri suggests that 
employment protection deriving from stringent legislation can be offset by legislation 
restricting wage setting, thus preventing firms to adapt and forcing layoffs that could 
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 Mortensen, D. and Pissarides, C. (1999), New Developments in Models of Search in the Labor Market, 





otherwise be avoided with a salary reduction. To understand these interactions 
regarding within country EPL reforms, recent studies have adopted a double 
differences approach, by comparing the before and after periods and segments 
affected and unaffected by the legislation. Two-tier reforms which affect one type of 
contract only, are ideal to study in this respect, as they induce both time-series 
variations as well as within-country variations. Exploring the effects of a quasi-
experiment in the context of two-tier labor markets is the object of this thesis and it 
prompts us to further explore the recent literature. 
The reaction of the French and Spanish labor markets to the financial and 
economic crisis in 2007-08, assumes particular relevance as the institutional 
framework of both countries can be described as a two-tiered labor markets, and yet 
the response was very different. As the unemployment in France went from 8% in 
2007 to 10% in 2009, unemployment in Spain rose from a historically low 8% in 2007 
to 19% in 2009. Bentolila, Cahuc, Dolado and Le Barbachon (2010) find one possible 
answer might be in the larger gap of dismissal costs between permanent and 
temporary contracts, and in the less restrictive legislation regarding the later in Spain. 
The authors use a calibrated search and matching model following previous work by 
Blanchard and Landier (2002) and Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002), which in turn were 
based on Mortenssen and Pissarides (1994), to explore how the different employment 
protection legislations affected the rise of unemployment on both countries, and how 
45% of the surge in unemployment could have been avoided, had Spain adopted the 
French employment protection legislation. If two-tier systems are the consequence of 
stringent protection legislation of permanent over temporary contracts, it is worth 
understanding why firms choose one or another type of contract. A recent paper by 
Cahuc, Charlot and Malherbet (2012) addresses this question by using a search and 
matching model with productivity shocks in the framework of Mortensen and 
Pissarides (1994), where production opportunities become unproductive at a constant 
rate. The problem for firms is to choose the contract type which provides the higher 
surplus, knowing that temporary contracts are not renegotiable and have a fixed 
duration, and that permanent contracts have a probationary period, can be 
renegotiated, and terminated for a cost. The idea that temporary contracts are used as 





the probationary period, the costs of hiring, and the costs of firing. After the moment 
of hiring, temporary contracts can be renewed or converted to a permanent contract if 
the productivity of the job remains constant. In both models, Bentolila et al. (2010) 
and Cahuc et al. (2012), the substitutability between contracts is a crucial assumption. 
This theoretical background provides some insight on why firms choose fixed-term 
contracts as a screening device or not. 
To further study the role of fixed-term contracts as a screening device, Portugal 
and Varejão (2010) use firm-level data (Social Security Records) and matched 
employer-employee data (Personnel Records) of Portuguese firms to address four 
questions: who hires temporary workers; who gets a temporary contract; who 
promotes from temporary to permanent contracts; and, who is promoted to a 
permanent contract after being hired on a temporary contract. At the hiring stage, 
firms with higher human capital intensity have lower shares of temporary contracts, 
and younger workers have a higher chance of being offered a temporary contract. The 
choice of offering a temporary contract heavily depends on the costs of forming a bad 
match. For positions of higher responsibility, firms invest more in the screening 
process and hire on permanent contracts, because the risk of committing errors at the 
higher levels surpasses the initial investment on the screening process. Temporary 
contracts are offered at lower skill levels, and to younger workers, as the risk of 
forming a bad match is not as high, and skill can be better accessed through 
experience. At the promotion stage, the profile of firms more likely to promote are 
also the ones that rely more heavily on temporary contracts. Those are the firms that 
follow a low cost hiring strategy, for reasons described above, or firms that used 
temporary contracts to increase production during an uncertain duration, or firms that 
invest in training and use temporary contracts to decide who to offer a permanent 
contract at the end of training. The authors conclude finding these results to be 
consistent with previous research for other continental European countries, but also 
for the US, with very employment legislation, which means this research, has a wider 
scope than could be expected. 
Following the thread of labor reforms in the context of two-tier market 
systems, Centeno and Novo (2012) provide causal evidence on the relation between 





with a higher share of fixed-term contracts exhibit higher rates of excess worker 
turnover, as fixed-term contracts are temporary, and dismissal costs are lower. The 
institutional change is the 2004 labor code reform, which introduced more stringent 
legislation regarding dismissals of open-ended contracts in firms with 11 to 20 
workers, thus increasing the implicit firing costs on open-ended contracts for a 
particular subset of firms. This quasi-experiment permitted the authors to confirm with 
empirical evidence the idea that a wider gap in EPL leads to an increased reliance on 
fixed-term contracts. Another consequence of a wider protection gap is the lower 
conversion rate from fixed-term to open-ended contracts, as predicted by Boeri (2010) 
and confirmed by Centeno and Novo (2012) for this particular setting. 
3. Portugal and the 2004 Labor Code Reform 
3.1 Background 
In 2003 Portugal had the highest overall strictness of employment protection 
legislation (EPL) among OECD member countries4, especially due to the protection of 
permanent workers against individual dismissals. The strictness of EPL on open-ended 
contracts was partially counter balanced by relatively more flexible fixed-term 
contracts. Introduced in 1976, fixed-term contracts were meant to be used for short 
duration projects or to face temporary higher demand, without replacing permanent 
contract for permanent positions. Over time fixed-term contracts became increasingly 
relevant in the Portuguese economy, with the share of fixed-term contracts accounting 
for 17.6% on average between 1995 and 2003 (one of the highest shares of the EU15 
in 2003, second only to Spain) and reaching to 26.5% in 2008, which can be attributed 
to the higher flexibility provided by fixed-term contracts. Although EPL concerning 
collective dismissals on open-ended contracts became less stringent after a law change 
from May 1989, studied by Martins (2009), the gap remained. Contrary to most high 
EPL countries which have strict regulation on fixed-term contracts, in Portugal fixed-
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term contracts are more flexible5, and that makes Portugal a unique case of a two-tier 
labor market. 
The 2004 labor code reform6 introduced procedural dismissal costs for open-
ended contracts, for firms with 11 to 20 workers, which were until then exempt from 
such requirements. These procedural costs include written procedures, witness 
interviews, workers councils, and the union if the worker is a union delegate. This 
means procedural costs are non-trivial, especially for small firms which may lack the 
means for such legal action, while fixed-term contracts have no cost at expiration.  
 
3.2 Data 
The data (‘Quadros de Pessoal’) is a matched employer-employee longitudinal dataset 
(‘Personnel Records’) collected on an annual basis, which contains information on all 
wage earners in Portugal, excluding independent workers and civil servants. The data 
is collected since 1985, but only since 2002 we have information on each worker’s 
contract type. From 2002 to 2008, the average number of workers per year is around 
2.4 million and the number of firms 350 thousand. Since this is yearly data, all hires 
and separations that occur between years are not reported. This data has been 
extensively used, including in the aforementioned studies by Martins (2009), Portugal 
and Varejão (2010), Centeno and Novo (2012), and a detailed description of the 
dataset can be found in Cabral and Mata (2003). Worth of note is the fact that during 
the time period 2002-2008 there were adjustments to identification of workers, 
particularly in larger firms, but as this study will focus on the 11 to 100 workers firms, it 
is hoped this discrepancies will be negligible. 
  
                                                      
5
 See Blanchard and Portugal (2001) for more on the specific nature the Portuguese labor market 
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As the definitions established by Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996) became 
standard in the literature, we find slight differences in how formulas are presented, 
and different ways of calculating the same concepts, which in turn can also have 
different names according to each author. In order to clarify the concepts used my 
thesis, I will first present and then explain each formula. 
 
Job Creation and Job Destruction Rates 
Starting with the concepts of gross job creation and job destruction, they refer to the 
total creation of jobs by expanding firms, or destruction by contracting firms. The 
formulae for these calculations are as follows: 
 
Gross job creation: 
, =	 	
, − 	
, 	 ∈ 	   
Gross job destruction: 
, =	 |	
, − 	
,| 	 ∈ 	 
 
Where f denotes firms, t represents any given year, ‘Jobs’ stands for the number 
employees at a given year, and S with the superscripts + and – indicate if the firm 
belongs to the subset of expanding or contracting firms. These numbers can be 
expressed as rates when divided by the average employment size of the subset 
calculated: 
 





























While trivial from a mathematical standpoint, this clarification is crucial, because if we 
interpret job creation as the aggregate number of jobs created by expanding firms, and 
obtain the rate dividing by the average employment in the subset, we are calculating 
very different things. It is the difference between the economy job creation rate, and 
the average of the firm’s individual job creation rates. As this is completely a firm level 
based analysis, I will only be interested in the later. 
 
Hiring and Separation Rates 
Regarding hiring and separation rates, they are calculated by the sum of all hires or 
separations, in a given firm in a given year, over the average employment between 
two consecutive years. A worker is considered as hired if he or she was not employed 
at firm f at time t-1. A worker is considered as a separated7 if he or she was employed 
at firm f at time t-1 but not at time t. If a firm no longer exists at time t, because it 
closed between t-1 and t, the employees at t-1 are considered as separations in period 
t even though they may be employed at another firm at time t. The hiring and 











The yearly rates are calculated by taking the simple average of all firms at year t. 
 
Excess Worker Turnover 
Excess worker turnover (EWT) measures the number of workers that were hired, or 
that separated, in excess of those strictly necessary to achieve the desired level of 
employment. When the number of hires and separations (worker flows) that occurs in 
a firm in a given year exceeds the number of jobs created or destroyed during that 
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 A separation can be one of 4 cases: voluntary separation, involuntary separation, retirement, and 
death. From Portugal and Varejão (2010): “For the universe of Portuguese firms with at least 100 
employees, the voluntary quit rate of workers with an open-ended contract is 5.5 percent. Exits into 
retirement and worker’ deaths account for 8.3 and 1.6 respectively, of the total number of separations 





year by that firm (job flows), the percentage by which the worker flows exceed the job 
flows is called excess worker turnover. This measure can be calculated from the hiring 
and separation rates described for before. One important concept is that of net 
employment change (NEC) which is the difference between hires and separations. It 
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This can be written as: 
 
#$%, =




The formula implies that if either !, or , is zero #$%, will be zero. If the number 
of hires or separations is positive, it will necessarily correspond to the employment 
variation. The other observation is that the maximum value #$%, can take is 2. The 
maximum value of #$%,  is reached if: 1) the number of hires and separations are 
equal, which implies no variation in job flows; and 2), if the number of hires and 
separations corresponds to the number of jobs, which is only the case if the entire 
workforce is replaced during the year. When calculating EWT for one type of contract 










Contract Conversion Rate 
Contract conversion rate (CCR) is the ratio between the sum of all workers on open- 
ended contracts that were working in the same firm on a fixed-term contract the 
previous year, over average number of workers on fixed-term contracts between years 





Where Conv is a binary outcome which takes value 1 when a worker with a open-
ended contract had a fixed-term contract the previous year. CCR can take values 
between zero and two. It takes the value zero when the numerator is zero, and the 
value 2 when all fixed-term contracts from the previous year have been converted and 
the firm did not hire any new workers on fixed-term contracts. It is the case of the firm 
that had 2 workers on fixed-term contracts, converted both to open-ended contracts, 
and the average 
 
4.2 Econometrics method 
Difference in differences has become the preferred method to study the impact of 
policy changes when panel data is available, because of the ability to isolate the effect 
of a given treatment over a treatment group, by comparing the before and after 
periods, and measuring the results against a similar control group for counterfactual 
analysis. Whereas a within effects estimation, would compare the before and after 
periods within the treatment group, and a between effect estimation would compare 
the treatment and control groups, the difference in differences estimation permits the 
combination of the two, by measuring the post and after treatment effects between 
the two groups. While the definition of the treatment group is a premise, selecting the 
control group requires greater care as it may decisively affect the conclusions. The 
control group should be as similar as possible to the treatment group, at least so we 
can assume that in the absence of treatment the differences between groups would 
remain the same over time. When available, control variables can be used to obtain a 







y) =	* + +, + -) +	.) 
 
Where  y) is the independent variable, for individual i in state s at time t, * is the 
after dummy, +, is the treatment dummy, -) is the after*treatment dummy, and 
.) is the error term. Additionally the model may include a vector / to control for 
individual characteristics. 
Given the purpose of this thesis is to study the impact of stricter EPL on a 
subset of firms, the difference in difference approach seems adequate. The treatment 
is the introduction of higher dismissal procedural costs, the before period the years of 
2002 and 2003, and the after period the years from 2004 to 2008. The treatment 
group is constituted by the firms with 11 to 20 workers, and the control group is 
constituted by the firms with 21 to 100 workers. This control group has roughly the 
same size of firms as the treatment group, and shares the same institutional 
framework. Firms are assigned to treatment and control groups on a period-by-period 






5. The Portuguese labor market. 
5.1 Stylized facts 
In this section the main dynamics of the Portuguese labor market are characterized, 
with particular attention to the subset of firms with 11 to 100 workers and the relation 
between both contract types. 
Beginning with a brief summary of worker and job flows, Table 1 presents the 
yearly average job creation and destruction for all firms, in comparison to the yearly 
hiring and separation rates. This table considers only the continuing firms in the 
economy. The results for the entire 2002-2008 period are similar to those calculated 
by Centeno and Novo (2012), which in turn consistent with stylized facts in the 
literature, namely the correlation between job and worker flows. While the magnitude 
of flows can be different across countries, the ratio of worker flows to jobs flows tends 
to be similar, as Bassanini (2010) finds comparing a set of OECD countries as 







Job Job Hiring/ Separation/
Creation Hiring Destruction Separation JC JD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)=(2)/(1) (6)=(4)/(3)
2002-2003 13,2 28,2 12,7 27,8 2,1 2,2
2003-2004 13,3 30,5 11,5 28,7 2,3 2,5
2004-2005 14,1 30,7 10,4 26,9 2,2 2,6
2005-2006 11,2 23,5 11,3 23,6 2,1 2,1
2006-2007 12,0 24,1 10,4 22,4 2,0 2,2
2007-2008 11,1 23,4 10,9 23,2 2,1 2,1
Total (2002-2008) 12,5 26,7 11,2 25,4 2,1 2,3
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2002-2008





Higher hiring rates than job creation rates implies that more workers are hired 
than those strictly needed to fill the job vacancies. The same is true for separation 
rates and job closings. This is known in the literature as excess worker turnover, and it 
measures the reallocation of workers to jobs. Higher turnover rates are a sign of lower 
job stability, but it also means more worker-firm matches are being tested and 
potentially it can generate more productive matches. One indicator that these 
productive matches are being created is the contract conversion rate, which measures 
the rate at which fixed-term contracts are converted to open-ended contracts. As both 
expanding and contracting firms are simultaneously hiring, separating and promoting 
workers, it is useful to have a global outlook. Table 2 presents the average excess 
worker turnover and contract conversion rates for both the treatment and the control 
group and for the entire observation period. Columns 1 and 1’ report firms with net 
job creation, columns 2 and 2’ report firms with stable employment, and columns 3 
and 3’ firms with net job destruction, and the category is defined by the firm’s 
situation at the current year, meaning the same firm can be in all 3 column groups if 
during the time period it experienced increasing, decreasing and stable employment. 





Firm size EWT CCR EWT CCR EWT CCR
(1) (1') (2) (2') (3) (3')
[11, 20] 33,5 16,5 36,6 19,5 31,9 18,1
[21, 100] 36,1 17,4 37,9 20,0 35,4 19,5
Difference 2,5 0,9 1,3 0,4 3,5 1,3
Employment
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2002-2008.
EWT: Excess worker turnover
CCR: Contract conversion rates
Table 2: excess worker turnover and contract conversion rates
64.463 269.909337.553
 by treatment and control groups, 2002-2008
Firms with





On average 50% of all employment is on expanding firms, 40% on contracting 
firms, and only 10% in firms with stable employment. The magnitude of excess worker 
turnover is high for firms in all groups8, but perhaps the most important results comes 
from the fact that larger firms report generally higher rates of both excess worker 
turnover and contract conversion rates. This is consistent with the findings by Davis et 
al. (1996) who found job and worker flows to be highly correlated with firm size. The 
reasoning is that larger firms have more room to adjust employment and actively seek 
better matches, so there is a higher frequency of simultaneous hires and separations, 
while smaller contracting firms refrain from hiring and expanding firms avoid 
separations, because the costs of hiring and separations do not outweigh the benefits 
of worker reallocation. For the contract conversion rates we find that firms increasing 
employment show lower rates, which derive from the fact that those firms are hiring 
more workers, and the conversion rates are calculated over the average number o 
workers on fixed-term contracts. Still, the difference in magnitudes between the two 
groups is relatively small, and that means these groups share roughly the same 
characteristics and are comparable. 
A link between excess worker turnover and contract conversion rates can be 
found in survival and conversion probabilities. The longer a match survives the more 
stable the worker-firm match is, and in an economy with high survival probabilities 
worker turnover is probably low. On the other hand, contract conversion rates tell us 
something about how excess worker turnover on fixed-term contracts is being used, 
which has important implications for the economy. On this subject Nagypál (2001) 
finds that if fixed-term contracts are used as a buffer stock, allowing firms to adjust to 
shocks more easily, it is efficient in the short run and avoids labor hoarding, but as it 
reduces job stability firms do not capitalize on match specific learning-by-doing. When 
firms use fixed-term contracts as a screening device, they learn more about match 
quality which translates to better growth perspectives in the long run. 
To find more about this relation, table 3 presents the four-year match survival 
probabilities for all contracts in columns (1) and (1’), the four-year match survival 
probabilities for fixed-term contracts that did not convert to open ended contracts in 
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 The magnitude of EWT for firms with stable employment should be clearly lower, but the results are 





columns (2) and (2’), and the four-year match survival probabilities for fixed-term 
contracts that did convert to open ended contracts in columns (3) and (3’). The years 
2002 and 2004 are considered as the base year, representing the before and after 
periods. The base year includes all matches verified in that year regardless of worker 





The results suggest the differences found between 2002 and 2004 are worth 
pursuing. From columns (1) and (1’) we find that, while the survival probability of the 
2004 matches is higher during the first two years, it converges to a point close to 40%, 
which indicates the existence of a stable set of worker-firm matches that is resilient to 
changes9. From columns (2) and (2’) we find an overall prevalence of fixed-term 
contracts when 2004 is the base year. The longer duration of fixed-term contracts 
suggests that firms have opted for fixed-term instead of open-ended contracts, either 
by hiring more workers on fixed-term contracts, or by extending the contract duration 
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Year: (1) (1') (2) (2') (3) (3')
t=1 61,3 68,2 37,5 45,4 13,0 11,7
t=2 52,0 57,8 21,7 27,2 17,7 17,7
t=3 48,1 51,1 14,6 18,4 20,3 19,0
t=4 43,0 44,7 10,0 13,3 20,4 18,6
Average: 51,1 55,4 21,0 26,1 17,9 16,8
Source: Quadros de Pessoal , 2002-2008.
Notes: One match is a worker-firm pair. The 2002 and 2004 matches are the sum of 
all worker-firm pairs registred in that year. The table presents the percentage of 
workers at time t who were working on the same firm at the base year 2002 or 2004.
Fixed-term contracts
Still fixed-term
Converted to             
open-ended
Survival rates of all 
matches





of existing fixed-term contracts10. The substitution of contracts as a reaction to more 
stringent EPL is an expected result, as the models of Bentolila et al. (2010) and Cahuc 
et al. (2012) predict. The degree of substitutability between contracts can be found in 
higher excess worker turnover rates which will be tested further. Comparing columns 
(3) and (3’), we find lower ratios of matches converted to open-ended contracts from 
2004, as expected, although the difference is relatively small. 
 
5.2 Summary statistics 
To understand why, it is useful to collect and summarize the firm-level data for 
the sample of treatment and control firms, including key variables as the share of 
fixed-term contracts, excess worker turnover and contract conversion rates. Table 4 
was constructed for this purpose. The average share of fixed-term contracts is 26%, 
global excess worker turnover rates are high near 32%, mostly due to the presence of 
fixed-term contracts, and the contract conversion rate is near 17%. The sample 
contains a total of 4.394.161 worker-firm matches, distributed among 48.877 unique 
firms11. The treatment group is slightly larger than the control group, accounting for 
55% of the number of observations, and the number of observations is larger in the 
after period, as the period 2004-2008 contains more observations than the 2002-2003 
period. Firm workforce composition is taken from the simple average of the individual 
firm’s workforce composition. 
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 In 2003 fixed-term contracts could last up to 6 years. The new law reduced the maximum contract 
duration to 3 years. 
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 Firms are counted only the first year they appear in the dataset. The number of observations is the 







Variable (firm level) Mean Std.
Deviation
Fixed-term contracts per firm (in %) 26,2 28,54
Total excess worker turnover (in %) 31,8 33,08
Excess worker turnover by contract type:
Fixed-term contract 36,1 45,81
Open-ended contract 21,6 31,72
Contract conversion rate 16,7 38,69
(Log) base wage 64,4 0,34
Blue-collar workers (in %) 29,7 32,59
Educational level, percentage of workers with:
9 or less years 71,3 27,66
10-12 years 18,2 18,71
College 10,4 17,00
Females (in %) 42,4 32,49
Immigrants (in %) 4,8 12,95
Manufacturing and Utilities 44,9 49,74
Commerce and Services 38,5 48,66
Firm size (average number of workers) 25,7 17,85
Firm age ( in years) 20,7 27,84
Workforce average age (in years) 38,0 5,26
Workforce average tenure (in months) 85,8 60,60
Worker firm matches (2003-2008)
Number of firms















Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2002-2008. The before period corresponds to 
2002-2003, and the after period to 2004-2008. Each period a treatment 






6. Empirical assessment of the 2004 Labor Code Reform 
The previous chapters have set up the theoretical framework, provided the 
background of the 2004 Labor Code Reform, characterized the job and worker flows in 
Portugal, and presented stylized facts for the sample of firms directly affected by the 
reform in comparison with its control group. This chapter follows a difference-in-
differences approach to find the effect of the reform on both the treatment and 
control groups, particularly on the use of fixed-term contracts as a screening device. 
 
6.1 Unconditional difference-in-differences 
Following the approach from table 3, match survival and conversion rates, I construct 
table 5 to isolate the treatment and control groups and to identify the effect of the 
policy change on the treatment group. The before period includes all firms in 2002 and 
2003 with 11 to 100 workers, and the after period all firms with 11 to 100 workers in 
2004 and 2005 (table 5). The survival and conversion rates are calculated as in table 3, 
with the difference that for each period there are two base years. Considering two 
base years partially mitigates the bias that comes from considering only one year as 
representative of the entire period12. The two-year survival window comes from the 
fact that most fixed-term contracts are terminated or converted within two-years. 
The results are consistent with table 3 and in line with the literature regarding 
EPL and two-tier models. The increase in procedural firing costs for open-ended 
contracts led firms to increase the share of workers on fixed-term contracts as the 
comparison between columns (2) and (2’) indicates. Moreover, this effect is positive 
for the treatment group in the after period, which means the group of firms directly 
targeted by the policy change had a stronger reaction than the control group for the 
same period, as would be expected. In columns (3) and (3’) we see that, while the 
control group has kept the share of fixed to open-ended contracts almost unchanged, 
the treatment group has reduced that share by 1.3 percent points. Finally for columns 
(1) and (1’), while the job stability seems to have increased in the after period, it 
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increased less for the treatment group, which may come from the higher reliance on 





However, the unconditional difference-in-differences analysis may not be 
sufficient to capture the effects of the law change, as it is possible that there are other 
factors which affect the outcome and were not yet being considered. Insofar as these 
factors are observable, it is possible to include them as control variables in a 
conditional regression. 
 
6.2 Conditional difference-in-differences 
To obtain a clearer picture of how different firms have reacted to this reform, the set 
of firm characteristics presented on table 4 such as education, average tenure and 
average wage, combined with additional conditions to control for features as firm size 
Before After Before After Before After
(1) (1') (2) (2') (3) (3')
Treatment 35,7 40,1 13,9 18,7 11,2 9,9
Control 48,8 53,6 21,4 25,6 15,8 15,4
Differences (T - C) -13,2 -13,5 -7,5 -7,0 -4,6 -5,6
Difference-in Differences
Source: Quadros de Pessoal , 2002-2007.
Table 5: Duration of macthes: Unconditional difference-in-differences
Two-year Two-year probability
survival probability that a fixed-term
is still is converted to
Notes: The before period considers 2002 and 2003 matches; the after period condiers 2004 and 
2005 matches. Treatment firms have 11 to 20 workers and control firms 21 to 100 workers. 
Columns (1) and (1') show the probability of finding the same worker-firm match two years 
after the base year; Columns (2) and (2') show the probability of finding a worker employed on 
a fixed-term contract at the base year, that still works for the same firm on a fixed-term 
contract; Columns (3) and (3') show the probability of finding a worker employed on a fixed-








and age, are important explanatory factors for the use of fixed-term contracts as either 
a flexibility mechanism or as screening device. 
To account for firm and workforce characteristics, for the treatment and 
control groups, I the before and after periods, I used a conditional difference-in-
differences model: 
 
0 =	%1234 + 5421 + 5421%1234 + /* +	. 
 
Where he dependent variable will be the share of fixed-term contracts in column (1), 
excess worker turnover for fixed-term contracts in column (2), excess worker turnover 
for open-ended contracts in column (3), excess worker turnover for all contracts in 
column (4), and the contract conversion rate in column (5). %1234	 is a dummy 
variable for the treatment group, defined in each period t for all firms with 11 to 20 
workers, 5421 is a dummy variable for the after period 2004-2008, and 
5421%1234 identifies the impact of the policy change by assuming the value 1 for 
the treatment group in the after period. / represents a set of characteristics by firm, 
as presented on table 4, among others listed on the notes for table 6. This regression 
uses fixed-effects estimators for it is assumed that firms have different policies 
regarding match reevaluations, which lead to different hiring, separation and contract 
conversion practices, even across firms that share similar characteristics. 
From table 6 column (1), the share of fixed-term contracts is expected to be 
higher in the after period as table 5 suggests, treatment firm in the after period should 
also be higher when compared to the control group. The regression results confirm 
this, and the negative treat variable is also expected, since table 5 has shown a lower 
prevalence of fixed-term contracts among treated firms. Looking at the other 
independent variables, we find that the share of fixed-term contracts is negatively 
correlated to worker tenure, worker age, and base wage, and positively correlated to 
firm size. Expanding firms are expected to have higher shares of fixed-term contracts 
than contracting firms, and the services sector which includes seasonal activities, also 
tends to have higher shared of fixed-term contracts compared to manufacturing. This 
largely corresponds to the profile of firms that use fixed-term contracts as described by 





fixed-term contracts is predicted in the models of Bentolila et al. (2010) and Cahuc et 
al. (2012) provided there is substitutability between contracts which is reflected on 
higher excess worker turnover rates. 
More stringent EPL should reduce excess worker turnover and create more 
stable employment relations, at least for the type of contract it protects. This is tested 
in column (3), where indeed EWT among open-ended contracts decreased for the 
treated firms in the after period, suggesting the policy change was efficient in this 
regard. However, and especially in two-tier labor markets, a one sided increase in EPL 
for one type of contract will have the opposite effect on the other. This is confirmed in 
column (2), where excess worker turnover increased for fixed-term contracts, in the 
treatment group, after 2004. As the overall excess worker turnover increased for 
treated firms after the policy changes, we can draw the conclusion that the policy 
change was ineffective in achieving higher job stability, as it may in fact have provided 
an incentive for firms to hire on fixed-term instead of open-ended contracts, and the 
higher shares of fixed-term contracts support this idea. 
Lastly, column (5) reports the results for contract conversion rates. The after 
period shows a negative correlation, which was expected from table 5 as the number 
of surviving matches on open-ended contracts decreased. The treatment group also 
reports a negative correlation, as we have seen in table 5 the differences (T-C) were 
negative. What strikes as odd is the positive and relatively high correlation of the 
treatment group in the after period, as treated firms on aggregate have reported lower 
surviving matches on open-ended contracts in the after period. One possible 
explanation comes from the different estimation methods. On table 5 we have 
aggregate values, on table 6 we have a regression on individual firm’s contract 
conversion rates. If we look at the distribution of CCR across treated firms, we find that 
in over 78% of all observations CCR is equal to zero. The firms engaging in contract 
conversions do not constitute a cohesive group either, and the decision to hire on a 
fixed-term contract and later convert to an open-ended contract appears to be 
idiosyncratic and circumstantial. What table 6 seems to indicate is that when observed 
individually, treated firms have not been deterred from converting fixed-term to open-
ended contracts, and in fact exhibit higher conversion rates than the firms in the 





The factors that increase the likelihood of a contract being converted are: firm 
size and firm age, with larger firms being more likely to convert contracts; firms with 3 
to 5 years are more likely to convert contracts than younger and older firms; average 
worker tenure and average workforce age, with older and more experienced workers 
increasing the conversion chance; higher average wage, and higher education. These 
results are consistent with the findings by Portugal and Varejão (2010) regarding the 
use of fixed-term contracts as a screening device. Younger firms typically face more 
volatile environments, it is common to hire on fixed-term contracts to gain flexibility, 
and later convert to open-ended contracts. Higher average workforce tenure and age 
suggest that the firm’s strategy relies on the worker’s experience, and for that reason 
it is more likely to convert temporary to permanent contracts.  Firms with higher 
human capital intensity, using average wage and education as proxies of human capital 
intensity, have higher conversion rates. The reasoning behind this behavior comes 
from the employer’s hiring strategy, initially offering a fixed-term contract under the 
tacit or implicit agreement of converting to an open-ended contract if the match 
proves to be productive. This idea is consistent with Nagypál (2001) and Author (2001) 
on the process of using temporary contracts as a mechanism to learn about the match 
quality. Overall the results confirm both theoretical predictions and empirical studies 









Dependent variables SFTC EFTC EOEC EWT CCR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
After 0,886 5,668 3,792 4,748 -1,061
0,152 0,535 0,331 0,328 0,482
Treat -0,906 -0,680 0,016 -0,409 -3,837
0,241 0,889 0,527 0,521 0,807
After x Treat 0,949 0,427 -0,307 0,342 4,280
0,202 0,757 0,441 0,437 0,687
Control variables
Average of dependent variable 26,2 36,1 21,6 31,8 16,7
Number of firms 48.877 35.023 46.318 48.877 48.877
Number of observations
Before
Treatment 14.033 8.770 13.781 14.033 8.770
Control 11.259 9.090 11.116 11.259 9.090
After
Treatment 80.823 56.200 77.976 80.823 56.200
Control 64.978 54.752 63.394 64.978 54.752
Total Total 171.093 128.812 166.267 171.093 128.812
Source: Quadros de Pessoal , 2002-2008.
C:[21; 100]
T:[11; 20]
Table 6: Quasi-experimental evidence: Difference-in-Differences
- Yes, See notes -
Notes: Standard errors are indicated below the parameter estimates. SFTC stands for 
the share of fixed-term contracts (in %); EFTC stands for excess worker turnover among 
fixed-term contracts (in %); EOEC stands for excess worker turnover among open-
ended contracts (in %); EWT stands for excess worker turnover (in %) among all fixed-
term contracts; CCR stands for contract conversion rate (in %) among fixed-term 
contracts. The before period corresponds to 2002-2003 and the after period to 2004-
2008. For each period a tream firm has 11 to 20 workers and a control firm has 21 to 100 
workers. The control variables included in the regression are: (i) log base wage; (ii) 
blue-collar workers (in %); (iii) Educational level, percentage of workers with: 9 or less 
years of college (10-12 year omitted); (iv) Females (in %); (v) Imigrants (in %); (vi) Log 
firm size (average number of workers); (vii) Firm age (in years) dummies: 2, 3, ..., 10 
years, 11-15 yearsand 16-20 years (21 or more years omitted); (viii) Workforce average 
age (in years) dummies: 15-30, 31-40, and 41-45 (46 or more years omitted); (ix) 
Workforce average tenure (in months) dummies: 1-36, 37-60, and 61-120 (121 or more 
months omitted); (x) Expanding and contracting employment dummies (stable 






6.3 Sensitivity analysis 
 
The assignment of treatment and control groups has been so far on a period by period 
basis, meaning that the same firm can belong to different groups in different years. To 
test if different treatment assignments lead to different conclusions, I repeated the 
regression from chapter 6.2 for two cases: 1) treatment and control groups are defined 
once in the before period, and firms remain in the assigned groups in the after period; 
2) only firms that never switched between groups are considered. The first case is 
presented on table 7 from columns (1) to (4), and the second case, also on table 7, 
from columns (5) to (8). The treatment parameter is omitted on both cases because 
these are fixed-effects estimators, and as firms never change between treatment and 
control groups the difference between groups is perfectly collinear. 
Comparing table 6 results with columns (1) to (4) from table 7, when treatment 
and control groups are defined in the before period, the estimates for the share and 
excess worker turnover among fixed-term contracts are higher. As excess worker 
turnover among open-ended contracts is lower in the after period, the results seem to 
indicate that the policy change had a greater impact on transferring the costs from 
higher employment stability among open-ended contracts, to higher employment 
instability among temporary contracts, when only the firms from the before period are 
considered. 
The results from columns (5) to (8), when compared to table 6, seem to have 
reacted less in terms of fixed-term contracts share and excess worker turnover, but on 
the other hand contract conversion rates are higher. As in this second group only firms 
that did not switch between groups are considered, this treatment assignment 
excludes many firms close to the fringes, from 17 to 23 workers on average, and which 
might have at some point passed from 17 to 21 workers, or from 22 to 20. Comparing 
the number of observation on table 6 and table 7, more than 40 thousand total 
observations fall in this category of firms that switched between groups. If a significant 
number of firms that registered job variation are excluded, it is expected that the 
remaining firms show lower excess worker turnover rates and higher reliance on 





A final consideration is to eliminate the firms close to size thresholds by 
redefining the treatment and the control groups. Firms with 18 to 25 workers were 
excluded from the before period, and firms with 10 to 11 workers were excluded from 
the after period. The treatment assignment method is period-by-period as in table 6, 
which allows for firms to move between groups. The results are similar to table 6 but 
the treatment effect is stronger, as the difference between both groups has increased 
by excluding fringe observations. 
Redefining the selection criteria and reassigning firms into different treatment 
and control groups, or new treatment and control groups, did not alter the conclusions 
taken from chapter 6.2, and added new information. On the role of fixed-term 
contracts, higher rates of excess worker turnover among fixed-term contracts, which 
have been verified, indicate a greater use of fixed-term contracts as a mechanism to 
respond to shocks. On the other hand contract conversion rates indicate that firms use 
fixed-term contracts to find the best possible match, assigning workers to the most 
productive jobs. A decrease in this rate, as has been verified in the after period for 
most regressions and comes from an unobserved factor, has potentially negative 
consequences on productivity as the frequency at which better matches are found 
decreases. These regressions have shown is that the contract conversion policy of 
firms with 11 to 20 workers does not seem to have been particularly affected by the 
increase in EPL. On the other hand, the group with 21 to 100 workers seems to have 










Dependent variables SFTC EFTC EOEC CCR SFTC EFTC EOEC CCR SFTC EFTC EOEC CCR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
After 1,713 6,462 2,618 0,018 0,398 5,153 2,421 -0,687 0,851 5,296 2,601 -0,827
0,153 0,529 0,330 0,477 0,164 0,603 0,376 0,555 0,168 0,586 0,369 0,531
Treat . . . . . . . . -1,206 -1,716 -0,650 -4,242
. . . . . . . . 0,294 1,083 0,651 0,981
After x Treat 1,303 0,743 0,105 3,909 1,283 0,358 0,414 6,152 1,166 1,105 0,120 4,055
0,197 0,721 0,426 0,651 0,221 0,883 0,507 0,814 0,236 0,886 0,521 0,803
Control variables
Average of dependent variable 22,5 36,3 21,8 17,8 25,3 35,4 20,9 16,8 26,4 37,0 21,8 16,7
Number of observations 172.260 105.659 147.780 104.189 127.199 94.320 122.860 100.115 139.469 107.206 134.867 113.398
Source: Quadros de Pessoal , 2002-2008.
Table 7: Quasi-experimental evidence: Treatment assignment alternatives
- Yes. See Table 6 -
Notes: Standard errors are indicated below the fixed-effects estimates. SFTC stands for the share of fixed-term contracts (in %); EFTC and EOECstand for 
excess worker turnover among workers on, respectively, fixed-term contracts and open-ended contract (in %). In columns (1) to (4) the treatment and 
control status are defined in the before period and kept the same each year throughout the after period regardless of the firm size. In columns (5) to (8) only 
firms wich never changed treatment status during the entire sampling period, i.e., it excludes movers by considering treatment firms that always had 11 to 
20 workers and similarly control firms that always had 21 to 100 workers. In columns (9) to (12) firms that clustered around the size tresholds are eliminated 
from the sample. In particular, in the before period, firms with 18 to 25 workers are excluded and, in the after period, firms with 11 or 12 workers are also 















Asymmetric institutional reforms provide unique opportunities to study the closest 
equivalent to a natural experiment in economics. In the case of two-tier labor markets, 
where the relation between workers with permanent and temporary contracts is 
already asymmetric, any reform targeted at one specific subset of workers or firms is 
particularly interesting, as it is possible to isolate and measure its effects. In addition, 
the role of fixed-term contracts, either as a screening device or as a flexibility 
mechanism with high turnover rates, has important implications for long term 
economic productivity. 
For these reasons the goal of this dissertation was to find the impact of an 
asymmetric institutional reform on the use of fixed-term contract as a screening 
device. Following the methodology used by Centeno and Novo (2012) to study the 
impact of the 2004 labor code reform on excess worker turnover and fixed-term 
contracts, I confirmed that the increase in employment protection legislation over 
open-ended contracts has increased job stability for workers on this type contract, at 
the cost of higher instability for workers on fixed term contracts. Firms have reacted to 
the reform by increasing the share of workers under fixed-term contracts, which 
supports the idea of a high degree of substitutability between both contracts types. 
Regarding the use of fixed-term contracts as a screening device, I found that at 
the aggregate level the firms directly affected by the reform seem to have decreased 
the contract conversion rate, although when taking into account firm level 
characteristics using a conditional difference-in-differences model, the effect seems to 
be reversed. While the use of fixed-term contracts as a screening device seems to be 
adopted as a regular policy in medium to large firms, in smaller firms their use seems 
to be heavily influenced by idiosyncratic motives. The increase in excess worker 
turnover was accompanied by an increase in the contract conversion rates within the 
group of affected firms, which is justified given the level of heterogeneity among firms. 
As the decrease in contract conversion rates affected all firms after the reforms, in 
particular firms not targeted by the increase in EPL, there might be a factor not 
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